Channel 12 Investigation Reveals Repeated Warnings to Netanyahu Before October 7

A major investigation broadcast Wednesday by Israel's Channel 12 News has revealed previously unpublished warning letters and new accounts of closed-door conversations showing that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was repeatedly warned in the months before the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack that Israel's internal political crisis was weakening its deterrence and could encourage its enemies to act.

The investigation, broadcast on Channel 12's flagship evening news program, includes previously undisclosed portions of letters written by then-IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi, then-Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and senior Military Intelligence officials. It also describes repeated requests by senior security officials for urgent meetings with Netanyahu that were delayed or rejected.

The material provides new insight into what senior security officials were telling the political leadership before October 7 and how Netanyahu responded.

Strategic Warnings Were Issued Before the Attack

According to Channel 12, the warnings began intensifying in March 2023, amid the government's controversial judicial overhaul and the growing national protest movement.

On March 19, then-head of Military Intelligence Research Brig. Gen. Amit Saar warned Netanyahu that Israel's enemies were considering whether to wait for the country to weaken further or take advantage of the situation.

Two days later, on March 21, Halevi sent Netanyahu a letter warning that Israeli deterrence was being eroded and that Israel's enemies were identifying opportunities to advance offensive plans.

Halevi requested that the issue be discussed with Netanyahu and senior commanders. According to Channel 12, no dedicated discussion of the letter took place.

Gallant Warns of Security Consequences

On March 25, Gallant publicly warned that the internal political crisis was penetrating the IDF and security services and threatening national security.

The following day, Netanyahu announced Gallant's dismissal, triggering mass demonstrations across Israel.

Channel 12 also revealed a previously unpublished draft statement prepared by Netanyahu's spokesman, Topaz Luk, during the crisis. The draft proposed freezing the government's judicial moves and reviewing Gallant's continued tenure while opening a political dialogue.

Netanyahu reportedly considered releasing the statement, but it was never issued.

July Warning: “It's Not Us”

The investigation reveals a further warning from Halevi on July 23, as the dispute over the judicial overhaul and military readiness intensified.

Halevi warned Netanyahu that the country's internal crisis was affecting Israel's deterrence and that its enemies were reassessing Israel's strength.

According to Channel 12, Netanyahu responded angrily:

“It's not us! Let them talk to those in Kaplan.”

The reference was to Kaplan Street in Tel Aviv, a focal point of the anti-government protest movement.

Around the same time, then-Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar reportedly used the secure “red phone” to warn Netanyahu about the possibility of war.

“Mr. Prime Minister, I am giving you a strategic warning of war,” Bar said, according to the investigation. “We will lose the ability to predict what will happen on all fronts, and something serious may happen.”

Meetings With Security Chiefs Were Repeatedly Delayed

Channel 12 also documented repeated attempts by senior security officials to meet Netanyahu directly.

On March 9, while Netanyahu was visiting Rome, the heads of the security organizations requested individual meetings with him upon his return. Netanyahu initially said he would consider the request, but several days later his office informed them that he would not meet with them.

On July 24, as the Knesset prepared to vote on legislation abolishing the reasonableness standard, Bar reportedly waited near Route 443 for approval to come to the Knesset and meet Netanyahu.

The request was rejected. Halevi's request for a meeting before the vote was also rejected, according to the investigation.

Warnings Continued Through August and September

The warnings continued during the final two months before October 7.

On August 9, Bar warned a Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee subcommittee:

“We are on the threshold of the perfect storm.”

He also warned of the possibility of a multi-front war and said Israel was experiencing a deterioration in deterrence.

On August 16, Gadi Eisenkot, then a member of the Knesset and a former IDF chief of staff, sent Netanyahu a letter warning of damage to military readiness and cohesion.

On September 7, exactly one month before the Hamas attack, Gallant sent Netanyahu a seven-page letter entitled “Analysis of the Implications of the Internal Situation on Israel's Security, Enemy Conduct in Light of IDF and Security-System Readiness.”

According to excerpts revealed by Channel 12, Gallant wrote that the worsening internal crisis was deepening the erosion of Israel's image among its enemies, damaging deterrence and increasing the likelihood of escalation.

He also linked the deterioration to weakening national resilience, military strength and willingness to serve.

Netanyahu's Suspicion of the Security Establishment

The investigation also cites accounts from people familiar with Netanyahu's inner circle indicating that the prime minister viewed some of the warnings through the political struggle surrounding the judicial overhaul.

According to one source cited by Channel 12, Netanyahu suspected that some senior security officials were attempting to undermine the government's judicial agenda and weaken his coalition.

In separate meetings with Halevi, Bar and Air Force commander Maj. Gen. Tomer Bar, Netanyahu reportedly complained that their predecessors had turned against him and suggested that they too would eventually join the protests in Kaplan.

Halevi reportedly replied:

“Politics doesn't interest me. I am warning about what we see in intelligence, warning about our enemies and about where we are.”

The Critical Distinction: Strategic Warning vs. October 7 Intelligence

The newly revealed documents raise serious questions, but they do not establish that Netanyahu received a specific warning that Hamas would launch its October 7 attack.

The letters and warnings described by Channel 12 were primarily strategic. They concerned weakening deterrence, military readiness, political instability and the possibility that Israel's enemies could exploit the internal crisis.

They did not necessarily specify the date, scale or operational method of the attack ultimately carried out by Hamas.

That distinction is central to the debate over responsibility.

Senior security officials were responsible for translating strategic warnings into operational preparedness, including protecting communities and military positions along the Gaza border. That process failed catastrophically on October 7.

At the same time, the newly revealed material raises questions about what the political leadership understood from the warnings and whether Netanyahu took sufficient action in response.

Netanyahu's Office Rejects the Interpretation

Netanyahu's office strongly rejected any suggestion that he received a warning of the October 7 attack.

In a statement reported by Channel 12, the prime minister's office said:

“Prime Minister Netanyahu did not receive any advance warning before October 7 about a Hamas attack from the Gaza Strip or by Hamas.”

The statement argued that official protocols submitted by Netanyahu to the State Comptroller show that senior security officials repeatedly assessed that Hamas was deterred, sought an arrangement and should receive humanitarian concessions in order to maintain calm.

Netanyahu's office therefore disputes the interpretation that the strategic warnings amounted to an ignored warning of the specific attack that took place.

September 26: “We Do Not Underestimate Any Threat”

On September 26, just 11 days before the Hamas assault, Netanyahu said at a ceremony marking the Yom Kippur War that Israel did not underestimate any threat.

Less than two weeks later, Hamas launched its unprecedented attack on southern Israel.

Approximately 1,200 people were killed and 251 people were taken hostage, according to Israeli and international counts.

A New Dimension in the Debate Over October 7

The Channel 12 investigation adds a significant new layer to Israel's continuing debate over responsibility for the October 7 disaster.

It does not prove that Netanyahu knowingly ignored a specific warning of the Hamas attack. Nor does it remove responsibility from the military and intelligence leadership, which failed to translate strategic warnings into effective operational readiness.

What the investigation does reveal is that senior Israeli officials repeatedly warned Netanyahu that the country's internal crisis was weakening deterrence and could create opportunities for Israel's enemies — and that some of those officials struggled to obtain direct meetings with the prime minister.

Three years after October 7, those revelations are likely to form another major component of the debate over the chain of decisions, warnings and failures that preceded the worst attack in Israel's history.