New Evidence Intensifies Questions Over Netanyahu’s Handling of Pre–October 7 Warnings

New reporting by The New York Times has intensified the controversy surrounding Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s handling of warnings ahead of Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack, after two sources told the newspaper that UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan personally warned Netanyahu in late September 2023 that Hamas was considering a major attack.

The report follows an earlier investigation by Haaretz, based in part on reporting by journalists Shlomi Eldar and Ruth Yuval, which said that Netanyahu received a warning from the Emirati leader approximately 10 days before the Hamas assault. The New York Times said the two sources it interviewed corroborated the central claim that the conversation took place and that the Emirati leader conveyed concerns about a major Hamas operation.

Netanyahu Continues to Deny Receiving the Warning

Netanyahu's office has repeatedly rejected the allegation.

The Prime Minister's Office has stated that Netanyahu did not speak with the UAE president during the period in question and did not receive a warning from him. It has argued that any relevant intelligence shared between the UAE and Israel would have been transmitted through established intelligence channels.

The UAE, meanwhile, has not confirmed the reported conversation. Its official response has emphasized that Israel and the UAE maintain open channels of communication and that relevant intelligence is shared between the two countries.

What the New Reporting Adds

According to the latest New York Times reporting, the issue is not limited to whether Netanyahu received a warning. The newspaper also examined what happened in the days following the reported conversation.

A report published on September 25 said that at a security meeting held on October 1, Netanyahu did not mention the alleged warning from the Emirati president. According to the report, minutes from the meeting indicate that Netanyahu emphasized the importance of maintaining calm in Gaza and expressed concern that a major Israeli military operation could undermine efforts to advance normalization with Saudi Arabia.

The report therefore raises a central question for any future official investigation: what information reached the prime minister, what did he understand from it, and what steps did he take in response?

A Warning Amid a Series of Intelligence Signals

The reported UAE warning was not the only indication of potential danger before October 7.

According to reporting cited by Israeli and international media, Israeli security officials had received other warnings concerning Hamas activity and the possibility of a significant escalation.

The controversy has also focused on an earlier warning attributed to then-Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar and on intelligence concerning Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar's intentions. According to reporting by The Times of Israel, Emirati intelligence itself had warned the Shin Bet in September 2023 that Hamas could carry out a violent operation before the end of the month.

The accumulation of warnings has transformed the debate from a question about a single intelligence failure into a broader examination of how information was assessed and acted upon at the highest levels of government and the security establishment.

The Central Question: Error or Failure of Responsibility?

The latest revelations do not, by themselves, establish that Netanyahu could have prevented the October 7 attack had he acted differently. Nor do they establish legally that he was negligent.

That determination would require a comprehensive examination of the intelligence available at the time, the precise contents of the reported warnings, Netanyahu's understanding of them, the information transmitted to the security services, and the decisions taken by the political and military leadership.

The distinction is significant. Intelligence warnings are often incomplete or ambiguous, and governments routinely have to make decisions under uncertainty. But if an investigation establishes that a concrete warning of a major Hamas operation reached the prime minister and was not passed to the relevant security bodies, that would raise a separate question concerning the decision-making process and the duty to respond to warning signs.

Political Storm Ahead of Israel’s Election

The controversy has become a major political issue as Israel approaches its 2026 election.

Opposition politicians have argued that Netanyahu must answer questions about what he knew before October 7 and why the alleged warning was not incorporated into the national security assessment. Netanyahu's political camp has rejected the allegations and accused his critics and the media of attempting to turn disputed reporting into political ammunition.

The dispute has also intensified after former IDF chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot publicly said that, based on inquiries he had conducted, he believed a warning from a senior source had reached Netanyahu's office, although he said he could not independently establish that the source was the UAE.

A Question for Any Future State Commission of Inquiry

The emerging controversy is likely to place one question at the center of any independent investigation into the events preceding October 7:

What did the prime minister know, when did he know it, and what did he do with that information?

The New York Times reporting does not settle that question. It does, however, add independent sourcing to a previously disputed account of an alleged conversation between Netanyahu and the UAE president and puts renewed focus on the chain of decision-making in the final days before the Hamas attack.