State Commission on Submarine Affair: Severe Systemic Failures - Personal Findings to Follow

The State Commission of Inquiry into the Submarine Affair, headed by former Supreme Court President Asher Grunis, published its interim findings on Sunday, identifying deep systemic deficiencies in Israel’s defense procurement and security decision-making processes.

According to the commission, the failures “go to the roots of force-building and decision-making processes in defense procurement costing billions of shekels,” as well as other sensitive security-political procedures — including Israel’s conduct regarding Germany’s sale of submarines to third countries.

Alongside the findings, the commission issued 13 recommendations, warning that past recommendations in similar cases “have not always been implemented.” In light of the October 7 attacks, the report states, implementation is now “an existential necessity.”

No Personal Conclusions; Netanyahu Among  Warned

The report focuses on systemic and institutional failures and does not yet include personal conclusions against individuals who were formally warned in the inquiry, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The commission said a separate report addressing individual responsibility will be issued once legal proceedings — currently delayed due to High Court petitions filed by those warned — are completed.

Grunis emphasized that while the report is not personal, the deficiencies identified are “the product of human actions and therefore entail responsibility.”

Failure to Document and ‘Chaotic’ Decision-Making

Among its central recommendations, the commission called for the establishment of a binding and regulated force-building process, including a requirement that the Prime Minister document discussions and understandings with foreign entities — a step the committee says was not taken in the submarine affair.

The report states that approval for Germany to sell submarines to Egypt was granted amid what it described as “chaos”, with no orderly process and no documentation of key discussions or agreements.

“The handling of the issue of arms sales by allies to third parties — a sensitive strategic matter — was conducted in a chaotic manner that endangered state security,” the report says.

Concerns Over Conditions Enabling Corruption

While the commission did not explicitly accuse individuals of corruption, it described an environment that enables it. The report notes that the Navy coordinated positions with commercial entities and presented manipulative data to decision-makers — issues that are also being examined in parallel criminal proceedings.

The lack of documentation, orderly procedures and effective oversight, the report warns, creates fertile ground for misconduct, whether intentional or negligent.

The report delivers sharp criticism of Israel’s decision-making bodies. It finds that the cabinet failed to shape force-building policy, with ministers telling the commission they served merely as a “rubber stamp” for decisions made by the security establishment.

In addition, the commission determined that the National Security Council (NSC) both failed to fulfill its duties and exceeded its authority. The report notes that former NSC head Yossi Cohen approached additional countries regarding submarine production and supply without cabinet authorization, deviating from official decisions.

Security Policy Must Reflect Israel’s Actual Needs

Grunis concluded that national security policy must be formulated “through a proper process and solely in accordance with the security needs of the State of Israel.” The wording, the report suggests, reflects the commission’s concern that those needs did not necessarily guide the policies examined.

The commission’s findings are expected to have significant implications for future defense procurement, governance standards and accountability mechanisms once its final, personal-responsibility report is released.