The UAE Warning: Did Prime Minister Netanyahu Receive a Direct Alert About October 7?

A dramatic new report has reignited one of the most consequential questions surrounding Israel's failure to prevent the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack: Was Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu personally warned by the president of the United Arab Emirates that Hamas was preparing a major assault — and, if so, what did he do with the information?

According to an investigation published Tuesday by Haaretz, UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan personally spoke with Netanyahu approximately ten days before the Hamas attack and warned him that Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar was preparing a major military operation against Israel.

The report, based on a forthcoming book by Haaretz journalists Shlomi Eldar and Ruth Yuval, says the conversation lasted approximately 45 minutes and took place toward the end of September 2023.

Netanyahu's office has categorically rejected the account.

"The press reports are false," the Prime Minister's Office said. "No warning was given to the prime minister from the United Arab Emirates before October 7." The statement added that if relevant intelligence had existed, it would have been transmitted through intelligence channels between the two countries.

The UAE itself has stopped short of confirming the alleged conversation. Its Foreign Ministry said the government does not comment on media reports or speculation, while emphasizing that Israeli and Emirati authorities have maintained direct communication channels and that relevant intelligence has been exchanged when necessary.

What the report says happened

The alleged warning originated, according to the investigation, with information passed through a chain of contacts involving Hamas, Palestinian intermediaries and senior Emirati officials.

The report says that Sinwar had conveyed that Hamas was preparing what he described as an "earthquake" — a major operation that would fundamentally change the situation.

The information eventually reached Mohamed bin Zayed, who allegedly decided to communicate directly with Netanyahu.

According to the report, the Emirati president warned that Hamas was planning a major offensive that could cause extensive bloodshed, destabilize the region and potentially threaten the Abraham Accords, the agreements under which Israel normalized relations with the UAE and several other Arab states.

The report says Netanyahu reacted relatively calmly.

Rather than treating Gaza as the immediate source of the most danger, he reportedly indicated that the West Bank represented the more immediate potential flashpoint and assured bin Zayed that Israel was prepared for any scenario.

The most explosive element of the report is not simply that a warning allegedly existed, but that Netanyahu supposedly failed to pass the information to senior Israeli security officials or take action based on it.

An Emirati source backs the account

The story became more politically significant after The Times of Israel reported that an Emirati source familiar with the alleged conversation confirmed that bin Zayed had warned Netanyahu.

The source reportedly had knowledge of the phone call and supported the basic account published by Haaretz.

That does not amount to independent documentary proof of the conversation. But it has complicated Netanyahu's denial, particularly because the UAE government has not said that the conversation did not occur.

Instead, Abu Dhabi has adopted a deliberately cautious position, stressing its intelligence-sharing relationship with Israel without directly addressing whether Mohamed bin Zayed personally warned Netanyahu.

Netanyahu: "No warning was given"

Netanyahu's response has been unequivocal.

His office says that the prime minister did not receive a warning from the UAE before October 7.

The Prime Minister's Office has also rejected the suggestion that Netanyahu was personally briefed by Mohamed bin Zayed about a planned Hamas operation.

Its statement leaves open the possibility that intelligence was exchanged between Israeli and Emirati security agencies, but firmly rejects the claim that the Emirati president personally delivered such a warning to Netanyahu.

That distinction could become crucial if an independent investigation ultimately examines the allegation.

The key questions would include whether the call took place, what exactly was said, whether the information was transmitted through official intelligence channels and whether Israeli security agencies were aware of the Emirati warning.

Why the allegation is politically explosive

The revelation comes at an exceptionally sensitive moment in Israeli politics.

Israel is heading toward its October 2026 election, with Netanyahu facing a powerful challenge from opposition figures including former IDF Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot and former prime minister Naftali Bennett.

Both have used the report to intensify their attacks on Netanyahu's record before October 7.

Eisenkot said that Netanyahu had already received numerous warnings before the attack and accused him of being unfit to continue serving as prime minister.

Bennett said Netanyahu bears "personal and direct responsibility" for the failures that allowed the October 7 attack to occur.

The leader of the Democrats, Yair Golan, similarly argued that the new report undermines Netanyahu's previous explanations concerning what he knew before the attack and when he knew it.

The wider warning system before October 7

The UAE allegation is particularly significant because it would not have occurred in isolation.

Israel has previously acknowledged that warnings and indications of unusual Hamas activity existed before October 7.

Egyptian officials also reportedly conveyed warnings to Israel in the period preceding the attack. Previous reporting has described Egyptian intelligence contacts warning that Hamas was preparing something significant.

The Israeli security establishment itself has since acknowledged a series of failures in intelligence assessment, operational preparedness and decision-making.

The central question has therefore never been simply whether Israel had any warning.

It has been whether the warnings that existed were correctly interpreted, properly transmitted and acted upon.

If the UAE allegation were ultimately verified, it would introduce a radically different element into that story: a claim that the head of a friendly Arab state personally warned Israel's prime minister about Hamas's intentions.

The Sinwar connection

The alleged warning is also significant because it specifically concerns Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader who masterminded the October 7 assault.

According to the report, the Emirati leadership was informed that Sinwar was preparing a major operation and that the consequences could extend far beyond the Gaza-Israel border.

At the time, however, Israeli policy toward Hamas was largely based on containing the organization and preserving a relatively stable status quo in Gaza.

That strategic assumption collapsed spectacularly on October 7.

Hamas-led forces crossed the border into southern Israel, killed approximately 1,200 people and abducted 251 hostages, according to Israeli figures. The attack triggered the devastating war in Gaza and ultimately a much wider regional conflict.

Could the alleged call have changed October 7?

This is perhaps the most difficult question — and one that cannot currently be answered.

Even if the conversation occurred exactly as described, there is no way to establish with certainty that acting on the warning would have prevented the attack.

But the allegation raises a different and potentially answerable question:

Did the prime minister receive information that should have triggered an immediate reassessment of Israel's security posture?

If the answer is yes, investigators would need to determine why the information was not transmitted to the Shin Bet, the IDF and military intelligence — and whether the decision was Netanyahu's personally or part of a broader intelligence and governmental failure.

Those questions cannot be settled by political statements alone.

Calls for an independent state inquiry intensify

The controversy has renewed demands for an independent state commission of inquiry into the failures preceding October 7.

Opposition parties have long argued that only a body independent of the government can determine responsibility among the political leadership, military and intelligence services.

Netanyahu's government has resisted establishing the type of inquiry demanded by the opposition.

The new UAE allegation is likely to strengthen those demands because, if verified, it could potentially provide investigators with a concrete episode in which a warning allegedly reached the highest political level.

The crucial issue: allegation versus fact

For now, one distinction is essential.

It has not been established as fact that Mohamed bin Zayed personally warned Netanyahu.

The allegation comes from investigative reporting based on multiple sources and a forthcoming book. An Emirati source has reportedly confirmed the account to The Times of Israel, while the UAE government has declined to confirm or deny the alleged conversation. Netanyahu's office categorically denies that he received such a warning.

Consequently, the most important unanswered questions are factual:

• Did the 45-minute Netanyahu–bin Zayed conversation take place?
• What precisely did the Emirati president tell Netanyahu?
• Was the information based on direct intelligence concerning Sinwar?
• Were Israeli intelligence and security officials informed?
• Did Netanyahu personally decide not to act on the information?
• Were additional warnings received through Israeli or foreign intelligence channels?
• And did any of these warnings reach the IDF or Shin Bet before October 7?

Until those questions are independently investigated, the UAE warning remains a highly consequential allegation rather than a proven account of what happened.

A new political fault line before Israel's election

The controversy nevertheless has immediate political consequences.

For Netanyahu's opponents, the alleged phone call represents potentially devastating evidence that the prime minister was warned at the highest diplomatic level and failed to act.

For Netanyahu and his supporters, the story is another example of what they describe as politically motivated attempts to assign personal responsibility for a catastrophic failure involving the entire Israeli security establishment.

The timing could hardly be more sensitive.

Three years after October 7, the political battle over who knew what, when they knew it and who failed to act remains unresolved.

If the alleged call between Mohamed bin Zayed and Benjamin Netanyahu is eventually verified, it could become one of the most important pieces of evidence in that debate.

If it is disproved, it will become another example of how the unresolved October 7 failure continues to generate competing narratives and political accusations.

For now, the central fact is not settled: Netanyahu says he was never warned by the UAE. The reported Emirati account says otherwise. The truth will ultimately depend on evidence, records and an independent investigation.