Defense Minister Yisrael Katz launched a direct and unusually harsh attack on IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir on Saturday evening, accusing him of acting contrary to the minister’s explicit request to delay a new round of senior officer appointments for 30 days.

Facing heavy criticism from within the defense establishment, Katz pushed back, rejecting claims that he is endangering national security or injecting political motives into the IDF.
“The issue of investigations and appointments in the IDF is of great significance in light of the events of October 7 and has no personal or political connection,” he said.

Katz: Review Revealed Critical Investigative Gaps

Katz detailed the sequence of events that followed the government’s review of IDF failures before and during the October 7 Hamas attack. He noted that during his previous term overseeing the army, he insisted on completing investigations before approving new generals, and that several senior officers subsequently resigned or were reassigned.

According to Katz, after taking office Lt. Gen. Zamir sought — and received — his approval to appoint a committee headed by Maj. Gen. (res.) Sami Turgeman to review existing investigations and determine whether additional inquiry was needed.

“Upon completion of the committee’s work, the report and recommendations were presented to me,” Katz said. “A central part of the recommendations was the need to re-conduct investigations that were carried out improperly and to complete investigations in areas that were not examined, including the very important issue of the ‘Jericho Wall’ — Hamas’ plan to dismantle the Gaza Division, first exposed by Israeli intelligence in 2018 but not given sufficient attention.”

Katz: Zamir Imposed Sanctions Without Consultation

The defense minister sharply criticized Zamir for proceeding with disciplinary measures against officers without informing or consulting him:

“I expected the Chief of Staff to act in accordance with the committee’s recommendations and deepen the investigations,” Katz wrote. “I was surprised when he summoned officers and imposed various sanctions on them without informing me and without consultation.”

Katz emphasized that under law, the defense minister approves all senior IDF appointments at the rank of colonel and above. He said he directed the Defense Establishment Comptroller to complete the investigations and deliver findings needed to form a position on the promotions.

He asked Zamir to pause all reassignments for 30 days until the process was complete — a request he says was ignored.

Katz added that he was “exposed to the intention” to appoint and grant brigadier-general rank to an officer who had “clearly called for and preached refusal.” He said he immediately informed the Chief of Staff that he would not approve the appointment, and that the candidacy was removed from the agenda.

Katz: Disagreement Does Not Harm IDF Operations

Despite the intensifying public rift, Katz insisted that operational activity has not been affected.
“There is direct and ongoing contact with the Chief of Staff and the IDF’s top brass,” he said, adding that numerous joint discussions are held regularly under the prime minister.

“The IDF is subject to decisions of the political echelon headed by the Prime Minister,” Katz declared. “My role is to ensure that the IDF upholds and implements those decisions. That is what I have done and will continue to do — for Israel’s security and for the good of the State of Israel.”

IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir published a nine-page unclassified document on Friday outlining, for the first time, his conclusions from the IDF’s internal investigations into the October 7 attacks and the review conducted by Maj. Gen. (res.) Sami Turgeman’s oversight committee. The document both accepts the military’s share of responsibility. It sharply underscores the need for an independent, external, and objective state inquiry into the role of the political echelon before and during the events of 7/10.

Senior IDF officials say privately that Zamir has been forced to “choose his battles” with the political leadership—particularly Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu—amid growing distrust. While Zamir has compromised on political demands in the past, he views the creation of an external investigation committee as a red line and intends to continue pressing for it behind closed doors.

Zamir: “The 7/10 Failure Was Systemic”

In his document, Zamir stresses that while the IDF failed to protect civilians on October 7, responsibility does not lie solely with the military.

“Imposing personal responsibility on commanders who dedicated their lives to the state is a heavy decision… Only an investigative committee with a complete, broad, and in-depth picture can make equal and fateful personal decisions,” he wrote.

Zamir emphasizes that determining final accountability must not be influenced by political pressure, and that personal responsibility extends beyond the sphere of the IDF.

Mounting Frustration Over Political Evasion

The Chief of Staff expresses implicit frustration shared by senior officers and much of the public regarding the government’s refusal to establish an independent inquiry, despite the passage of time since the massacre.

“The IDF took responsibility and investigated itself, but the incident is not his alone,” Zamir wrote, in an unmistakable reference to the political echelon.

He argues that only an external committee—like the Agranat Commission formed after the Yom Kippur War—can examine:

• The interface between military and political leadership

• The strategic concepts guiding Israel’s policy toward Hamas

• Intelligence presented to decision-makers

• Government oversight processes

• The division of responsibilities across agencies

Sharp Criticism of the Previous Chief of Staff

Zamir’s document confirms several key findings:

General Staff Failures (Night of Oct. 6–7)

He determines that the General Staff made “unprofessional” decisions on the eve of the attack, implicitly criticizing former Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi.

Southern Command Failures

The Southern Command did not prepare operational plans for defeating Hamas and failed to recognize dramatic changes in the enemy’s tactics.

Air Force Cleared—With Caveats

Citing the Turgeman Committee, Zamir concludes that the Air Force met all readiness requirements assigned by the General Staff.
However, he notes it failed to provide adequate defense against low-altitude aerial threats such as drones and explosive UAVs used by Hamas.

Political Tensions: Katz Rejects Promotions

Zamir sent the letter amid intensifying tensions with Defense Minister Yisrael Katz, who recently rejected several senior officer appointments—most notably that of Lt. Col. (res.) German Giltman, whom Katz accused of supporting refusal of service. Giltman denied the claim and asked Zamir to withdraw his candidacy.

Katz also ordered a renewed review of the Turgeman report after Zamir began drawing personal conclusions regarding several officers, prompting friction within the IDF’s upper ranks.

Zamir pointedly reminded the ministerial leadership that:

“All findings were to be submitted to the Chief of Staff only, and their use or disclosure remains at his sole discretion.”

This was widely interpreted as a warning against political exploitation or leaks.

Warnings Were Delivered to Leaders

Zamir underscores that throughout 2023, the head of the Military Intelligence Research Division had repeatedly warned senior military and political leaders that:

• Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas perceived Israel as internally weakened

• The regional threat picture was intensifying

• Israel’s enemies might seek to exploit this vulnerability

He writes that the inquiry must examine why these warnings were not converted into adequate preparedness, and why military concepts were shaped around managing Hamas rather than defeating it.

A Call for National Accountability

Zamir’s report marks the most direct and authoritative military demand yet for political accountability regarding October 7.
While avoiding explicit confrontation, the Chief of Staff makes clear that the IDF will not allow the burden of responsibility to fall solely on its shoulders.

He concludes with a warning:

“Intelligence-operational complacency is disastrous and poses a potential existential risk.”